Theft

D was paid twice by mistake but on discovering the mistake, he dishonestly decided to keep the money.  Ownership of the second payment passed to D on delivery of the pay packet so that he had not taken money belonging to another. 
s5(4) was introduced to protect V, where property was obtained by mistake.
 

D took his car to the garage for repairs.  The mechanic repaired the car and parked it in the road, outside the garage overnight, leaving the ignition key inside his office.  Following repair but before payment, D took the car.
CA upheld his conviction for theft stating that property could belong to another when in the possession of another
 

D was a taxi driver who gave a ride to an Italian student.  The driver told the student that the fare was 52p and the student offered £1.  The driver realised that the student didn’t understand.  He asked for his wallet and took out £7.  He was charged with theft.
D claimed that there was no appropriation of £6.48 as the student had consented.  HL said that consent was irrelevant.
 

D took £30 from the petty cash at work.  He spent the money on gambling and lost it.  He was charged with theft.  The CA stated that in deciding whether the taking of the £30 is dishonest it is necessary to look at the following factors:
1. Value of the property
2. Has the employer expressly forbidden the taking of money
3. Has D left an IOU
4. The reason the money was taken, eg emergency / personal use
5. Chances of repayment
6. The period of time which it was intended to take the money for
 

D, a partner in a firm of travel agents, had received money as deposits for flights to USA.  The flights never materialised and the deposits were not returned.
The CA held, on the particular facts of the case, that D had not received the money under an obligation to deal with it in a particular way and so his conviction for theft was quashed.
 

A thief may steal from a thief.
 

An undergraduate was found not guilty of theft where he unlawfully acquired an examination paper and returned it after he had read its contents.
 

D was a surgeon acting as a locum.  He falsely represented that he had carried out more work than he actually had in order to receive more pay.  He claimed that he had not been dishonest.
CA, upholding his conviction, stated that the test of dishonesty was subjective but was a matter of fact for the jury to determine, so creating 2 limbs to the test of dishonest:
Was what was done dishonest according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people; and
Did D realise that reasonable and honest people regard what he did was dishonest?
 

The 2 defendants swapped the price labels on the clothes in a shop so that they could purchase the clothes at a cheaper price. 
The HL held that there is an assumption of the rights of the owner if anything is done which the owner can do.
 

D was a projectionist who took films from the cinema where he worked so that his accomplices could make a master tape in order to make and sell copies.  He was convicted of conspiracy to steal.
The CA quashed his conviction stating that there was still virtue in the film.  They held that borrowing is equivalent to an outright taking if the intent of the borrower was to take the property and then to return it in such a changed state that it can truly be said that all its goodness or virtue has gone.
 

Insurers advertised a reward for the return of stolen paintings.  D contacted them offering to return the paintings, provided he was not to be arrested.  As he collected the £10,000 reward he was arrested and convicted of handling stolen goods.  D claimed he was not dishonest vis-a-vis the owner.  The CA said dishonesty was a subjective test and upheld his conviction.
 

There is no requirement in s2(1) that the belief held by D should be reasonable.
 

Gomez was employed at a shop selling electrical goods.  He was asked by an acquaintance to accept two stolen cheques in return for goods.  D represented the cheque as good to his manager, who then agreed to the transaction.  A second defendant took possession of the goods.  When the cheques were returned, marked stolen by the bank, the defendants were charged with theft.  D claimed that there was no appropriation as the manager had consented.
HL held that where property is obtained with the consent of the owner but that consent is induced by fraud, then D can be convicted of theft.  
 

D had been told by his girlfriend several times to change her front door.  On one occasion, en route to her council owned flat, he passed a new empty property also owned by the council.  He took the new door and swapped it for the old one.  He was charged with theft.  He claimed that he had no intention to permanently deprive as both properties were owned by the council. 
The CA held that there is no common sense intent but this case falls into s6(1) Part 1.
 

D had organised events to raise money for charity.  He had raised £3,000 which he kept in a separate bank account.  With the permission of the charity, he transferred £3,000 into his personal bank account then without permission, he spent the money.  He was found guilty of theft.  The money was held to belong to the donors under s5(3) as they had laid down a condition as to the use of the money.
 

HL considered the meaning of appropriation.
D, a 38 year old lady was friendly with a man of 53, of low intelligence and with no grasp of the value of his assets.  Over 8 months, he withdrew £60,000 from his bank account and deposited it in D’s account.  D was charged with theft and P claimed she had used her influence on a vulnerable man to coerce him to transfer the money.
D claimed she had not acted dishonestly and that the money was a gift.  Gomez and Lawrence were distinguished, as they did not involve gifts.
HL held that if D accepts a gift from somebody not incapacitated as a matter of law, where there is no fraud, no mistake and no threat, D can still be guilty of theft.  The gift amounts to an appropriation if the jury decide that he acted dishonestly in accepting it.
 

Offences Against The Person

The defendant placed an iron bar across the exit of a theatre.  He switched off the lights and the audience panicked and rushed to the theatre exit.  Many people were injured in the crush.  In relation to the minor injuries caused, the defendant was charged with battery.
 

Actual bodily harm was defined as to include any hurt or injury likely to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim and would include an injury to the state of mind.
 

The defendant is required to have taken an unjustified risk of some physical harm for grievous bodily harm s20.
 

The defendant accidentally drove his car onto a policeman’s foot and intentionally left it there.  It was held to be a continuing act and therefore an assault.
A battery must be committed by a positive act accompanied by the requisite mens rea.
 

The defendant committed an assault by looking through a window at victim in her night clothes with intent to frighten her.
 

The defendant was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm.  The defendant picked up a hitchhiker and threatened to rape and sexually assault her.  When the victim jumped out of the car, as a result of these threats, she suffered bruising.  The defendant argued that the causative link was missing and that her reaction was unreasonable and this caused her injuries.
It was held that the defendant caused assault occasioning actual bodily harm as the victim’s reaction to the threats was reasonably foreseeable.  There is causation if the actual bodily harm is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions.
 

In Savage, the defendant was involved in a fight in a pub and was charged and convicted of grievous bodily harm s20.  The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for s47 stating that it was not necessary to foresee harm for a s47 offence
In Parmenter, the defendant was convicted of 4 counts of grievous bodily harm s20 towards his son.  The Court of Appeal stated that it was necessary that the defendant must foresee harm to be convicted of s47.
The House of Lords stated that with reference to Offences Against the Person Act s47, it was unnecessary to prove that D intended or foresaw the risk of harm, however slight.
 

The defendant aggressively questioned and locked up a suspected thief of an engagement ring.  The prosecution alleged that the victim had suffered psychiatric harm amounting to actual bodily harm.  The defendant’s conviction was quashed on appeal as no psychiatric evidence was given to substantiate the actual bodily harm.
Actual bodily harm includes psychiatric injury but not fear, distress or panic.  The House of Lords stated that the body of the victim includes all parts of his body, including his organs, his nervous system and his brain.
 

5 men over the age of 30 from varying professional backgrounds were engaging in private sexual acts with each other.  Their sexual conduct, as they were over the age of 21 was not illegal.  They engaged in various sado-masochistic activities but no lasting physical harm was caused and the activities were consensual.
 
The men were charged with various offences from assault to s18 grievous bodily harm.  The defendants were convicted but raised the defence of consent, and that Human Rights Act 1998 Article 8 gave them a right to privacy and that Article 14 makes discrimination illegal.  They appealed to the House of Lords.  4 of the judges said that the actions were immoral and the state had a right to intervene even if there is consent.  Lowry LJ said that if people wish to express themselves in this way then they should be allowed the right to choose their sexual preference.  In 2000 the ECHR heard this case and they upheld the HL decision.
 

The defendant heated a knife and carved his initials on his wife’s thigh.  She complained of actual bodily harm and the defendant was charged with s47.  He raised consent as a defence and that branding was equivalent to tattooing.  The court held that the defence was good as there was a social value.
The difference between Wilson and Brown is the motivation, the parties’ sexuality and the marriage.
 

Ireland made repeated silent telephone calls at night to 3 women who consequently suffered psychiatric illness.  The Court of Appeal upheld his conviction as the defendant’s actions caused the victims to apprehend immediate and unlawful violence.
Burstow conducted an 8 month campaign of harassment against a woman which including both silent and abusive telephone calls.  There was psychiatric evidence of a resultant severe depressive illness.  The Court of Appeal upheld his conviction stating that psychiatric harm could amount to grievous bodily harm s20.
The House of Lords held that words alone, or even silent telephone calls are capable of amounting to an assault.
 

Following threats to the victim, the defendant broke down her door.  The victim jumped or fell out of the window suffering severe injuries.  The defendant was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to Offences Against the Person Act s20.  On appeal it was held that the prosecution had to prove causation and could do so by showing that the victim’s escape through the window was a natural result of the defendant’s actions.
The defendant is the cause of death / injury if that death / injury is the result of the victim reacting to the defendant’s conduct and such a reaction is reasonably foreseeable.
 

Murder

ACTUS REUS

The defendant poisoned his mother with the intent to kill.  Medical evidence established that she died independently of a heart attack.
If there is a break in the chain of causation then the defendant will not be the cause of death.  The defendant was not the factual cause of death.
 

The victim received treatment for stab wounds inflicted by the defendant and died shortly afterwards.  The wounds had almost healed and the treatment was the immediate cause of death.  On appeal, Jordan’s conviction was quashed. (Exceptional case)
 

Smith was stabbed twice by a bayonet and one wound pierced his lung.  He received bad treatment in hospital but at the time of death, the original injury was still a substantial and operating cause of death even though it was not the only cause. 
Negligent maltreatment as a result of an injury caused by the defendant will not break the chain of causation. 

Roberts picked up a hitchhiker and threatened to rape her.  The hitchhiker jumped from the car whilst it was still moving. 
 
The defendant is the cause of death or injury if that death or injury is the result of the victim reacting to the defendant’s conduct and such a reaction is reasonably foreseeable, ie not so unexpected that no reasonable person could be expected to foresee it.
 

The victim, a Jehovah’s Witness, refused medical treatment for a stab wound, on the grounds of her religion knowing that she would die as a result. 
The Court of Appeal stated that the wound inflicted by the def was still an operating cause of death and that “It has long been the policy of the law that those who use violence on other people must take their victims as they find them.  This in our judgment means the whole man and not just the physical man.” (Lawton LJ).
 

The defendant inflicted injuries upon the victim which caused brain damage.  The victim was placed on a life support machine but was declared brainstem dead.  The doctors then turned off life support. The Court of Appeal stated that the wounds caused by the def were a substantial and operating cause of death and that the doctors turning off the life support machine, did not constitute a novus actus interveniens.
“The fact that the victim has died despite or because of medical treatment for the initial injury given by careful and skilled medical practitioners, will not exonerate the original assailant from responsibility for the death” per Lord Lane.
 

Pagett kidnapped his pregnant girlfriend and used her as a shield to prevent his arrest by armed police.  The defendant shot at the police and the police returned fire, killing the girlfriend.
The defendant was liable for the death as it was a foreseeable consequence of his act.
 

During treatment for gun wounds inflicted by the defendant the victim developed respiratory problems and died as a result of a poorly administered tracheotomy.
The Court of Appeal stated that the defendant’s acts contributed significantly to the death of the victim and there was therefore no break in the chain of causation.

 

Dear slashed the victim repeatedly with a knife and he died 2 days later.  Dear claimed that the victim had reopened the wounds himself and had therefore broken the chain of causation, by committing suicide.
The wounds inflicted by the defendant were an operating and substantial cause of death even though the victim had aggravated those wounds. 

Following threats to the victim, the defendant broke down her door.  The victim jumped or fell out of the window suffering severe injuries.  The defendant was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s20.  On appeal, the court stated that the prosecution had to prove causation and could do so by showing that the victim’s escape through the window was a natural result of the defendant’s actions.  The court stated that it could be said to be a natural result of the defendant’s actions if a reasonable person could have foreseen the victim’s escape as a possible outcome.  This is an objective test of the actus reus of grievous bodily harm and therefore, the reasonable man did not have to bear the same characteristics as the defendant.
 

Moloney [1985] 

Hancock and Shankland [1986] 

Nedrick [1986] 

ATTEMPTED OFFENCES 

The defendant, a jeweller, had insured his stock against theft and concealed some of it on his premises, tied himself up with string and called for help.  He told the police that he had been robbed.
The defendant was convicted of obtaining money by false pretences.
CA quashed the conviction stating that the defendant’s actions were merely preparatory to the offence.  He had yet to approach the insurance company to obtain the money.
 

The defendant wanted to kill his wife so he wired up their metal bath tub to the mains electricity.  He didn’t do it very well so the wife discovered his intent and reported him to the police.  The defendant was convicted of attempted murder.
The court confirmed mens rea of attempted murder as being intent to kill only.
 

The defendant was convicted of attempted murder.  He had bought a gun, shortened the barrel, disguised himself then jumped into the back of the victim’s car and pointed the gun at the back of the victim’s head.  The victim grabbed the gun and escaped from the car.
Although the defendant had pointed the gun he had not released the safety catch and his finger was not on the trigger.
 

The defendant was charged with attempted theft.  He had placed an £18 bet on a greyhound but as the dog was doing badly in the race, he tried to jump on the track to void the race.  A void race would result in a refund of bets.  He was stopped by the police.
CA quashed the conviction and stated that jumping onto the track was merely preparatory.  He still had to make the claim to get his money back from the bookmaker.
 

The defendant was convicted of attempted robbery and was caught by police with an imitation firearm and a note demanding money, within 1 yard of a post office door
CA quashed the conviction.  They stated a number of acts remained to be done and until the defendant entered the post office, his acts were merely preparatory.
 

The defendant was found in the boys’ toilet of a school, equipped in such a way as to suggest that his purpose was kidnapping.  There was clear evidence of his intent but no evidence as to whether he had begun to carry out the offence.  His conviction was quashed.
 

SECONDARY PARTIES 

The defendant was charged with aiding and abetting his wife to have sex with their dog.  He had threatened her with serious violence if she didn’t have sex with their dog.  The defendant procured the offence and so was an accessory.  He was convicted of being an accessory to bestiality.  The wife was the principal as she committed the offence, but she was not charged.
The Court of Appeal stated that as long as the actus reus of the principal’s offence is fulfilled, the accessory can be liable even if the principal is never convicted.

“Where 2 persons embark on a joint enterprise, each is liable for the acts done in pursuance of that joint enterprise... including liability for unusual consequences if they arise from the execution of the agreed joint enterprise”, Parker CJ
 

A was charged with being an accessory to various explosive offences.  He had driven the principal to a pub with explosives in the car.  A claimed that he realised the principal might cause explosions or commit murder.  His defence was that he was unsure which crime the principal might commit.
The Court of Appeal said that if the defendant foresees various offences being committed by the principal he is liable as A for any of those that he foresees.
 

The accessory, A, laced the principal’s drink with alcohol.  The principal drove a car and was charged with drink / driving.  A did not foresee that the principal would drive.
In order to be liable as an accessory there must be foresight by A, that the principal would commit crime.
 

Involuntary Manslaughter

GROSS NEGLIGENCE

A doctor was administering to his patient during a home birth and didn’t take her to hospital in time.  The doctor was charged with gross negligence manslaughter.
“... in order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment.”  He stated that in a criminal court the amount and degree of negligence are the determining questions.  The court stated that there must be mens rea.
 

The defendant went to assist a bus which had broken down.  Driving fast, he overtook a car and hit the victim, a pedestrian.  The defendant did not stop.
The House of Lords stated that an offence whose basis is negligence is not an unlawful act for the purposes of constructive manslaughter.
Lord Atkin stated that manslaughter was based on the absence of the intention to kill and on the presence of the element of ‘unlawfulness’.
 

The defendant under supervision administered an injection of the wrong drug to a patient with fatal results.  Quashing the convictions for reckless manslaughter stating that the doctors should have been charged with gross negligence manslaughter.
 

Prior to an operation an anaesthetist failed to carry out various checks and as a result, several minutes into the operation, the patient died.  It was found that the machine to carry oxygen into the patient had become disconnected. The defendant was charged with gross negligence manslaughter.
The House of Lords followed Bateman, dismissing his appeal and stated that Caldwell recklessness is not part of the test.  They stated that the test of whether the breach was gross was a subjective test to be applied by the jury.
 

Church [1966] 

Lamb [1967] 

Lipman [1970] 

DPP v Newbury & Jones [1977] 

Dawson, Nolan and Walmsley [1985] 

Goodfellow [1986] 

Watson [1989] 

Ball [1989] 

Voluntary Manslaughter

 DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY

The defendant killed a woman by strangling her and then mutilated her body afterwards.  He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment but on appeal, his conviction was quashed and replaced by manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility.  The court found that Byrne was a sexual psychopath who found it difficult if not impossible to control his perverted desires.  It was the consensus of medical opinion that D’s sexual psychopathy could be described as partial insanity.
“Abnormality of mind has to be contrasted with the time-honoured expression in the M’Naghten Rules, ‘defect of reason’, means a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal.  It appears to us to be wide enough to cover the mind’s activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters and the ability to form a rational judgment whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will-power to control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment” per Parker LCJ.
 

An inherent cause does not have to exist at birth.
 

The defendant had a history of depression and violence.  After drinking heavily, he shot and killed a policeman, then went to a casino where he shot and killed 3 more people.  He was convicted of 4 murders but raised the defence of diminished responsibility.
Held: Though a case may arise where the defendant proves such a craving for drink or drugs as to produce in itself an abnormality of mind with s2(1) Homicide Act 1957 sufficient to form the basis of a defence of diminished responsibility, self-induced intoxication cannot of itself produce an abnormality of mind due to inherent causes
 

The defendant was in an unhappy marriage.  He drank and took drugs and received treatment for depression.  He clubbed his wife to death with a hammer then killed his stepdaughter.  In the commentary by J C Smith in the Criminal Law Review on Gittens, he states that there are 2 questions to be asked of the jury in a logical sequence:
 
Have the defence satisfied you on the balance of probabilities that if the defendant had not taken the drink,
He would have killed as he in fact did; and
He would have been under diminished responsibility when he did so.
The effects of self induced intoxication should be ignored as a source of mental abnormality.
 

The defendant, an alcoholic, drunk a bottle of vodka and then strangled her 11 year old daughter.  She was convicted of murder and appealed.  The Court of Appeal held that for a craving for drink or drugs in itself to produce an abnormality of the mind with s2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957, the craving had to be such as to make the use of the substance involuntary.  Tandy failed to establish that the first drink she took on that day was involuntary, therefore, the whole day’s drinking was voluntary.
 

The defendant killed his girlfriend by hitting her 100 times with a cricket bat.  At trial, the defendant raised the defence of diminished responsibility to a charge of murder stating that he was suffering from paranoia.  HL held that paranoia could come within ‘any inherent cause’ and substituted a conviction of murder for manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility.
Cases of diminished responsibility can be difficult for a jury so a judge should tailor his directions to suit the facts of the case.  Roch LJ stated that it would rarely be helpful to the jury to read the whole of s2(1) to them.
 

The defendant had taken a sleeping drug on prescription for some months.  He stated the drug caused an unforeseeable reaction including derangement of thought and mood.  The CoA did not include this as an ‘injury’ as it has a transient impact on the body, as does alcohol.
 

Bedder [1954] - No longer good law - Before the Homicide Act 1957 

DPP v Camplin [1978] 

Ahluwalia [1992] 

Vinagre [1979] 

R v Smith (Morgan James) [2000] 

Self Defence 

Palmer v R [1971] PC

If self-defence then the verdict is murder.  Self-defence offers no protection except complete protection.  Murder will not be reduced to manslaughter.
“If there has been an attack so that defence is reasonably necessary, it will be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessary defensive action.  If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken.  A jury will be told that the defence of self-defence, where the evidence makes its raising possible, will only fail if the prosecution show beyond doubt that what the accused did was not by way of self-defence”, per Lord Morris
 

D and 3 work colleagues were charged with the rape of his wife.  D invited the 3 men to have intercourse with his wife and told them to expect some resistance but they should not take this seriously as it was a pretence to stimulate her sexual excitement.  All four men dragged her out of a bedroom she shared with her child and took it in turns to rape her.  The judge told the jury that the men were guilty even if the belief V consented was unreasonable.  The 3 colleagues were convicted of rape and D was convicted of aiding and abetting rape.
 
HL held that mistake is a defence where it prevents D from having the mr which the law requires for the crime which he is charged but that the jury considered D’s evidence to be a pack of lies so the appeal was dismissed.
 

D was on a bus and saw an old woman with a bag on the street, being attacked by a civilian.  He rushes to her aid and pulls the young man off the lady who suffers bruising. 
“The mental element necessary to constitute guilt is the intent to apply unlawful force to the victim.  We do not believe that the mental element can be substantiated by simply showing an intent to apply force and no more”.
 

D and V had been drinking heavily and fell asleep.  D awoke to find V hitting him with a piece of glass in hand.  D picked up some glass, hit V and he died from the injury.
His appeal against conviction for manslaughter was quashed and CA held that a mistake of fact arising from voluntary intoxication cannot be relied on so far as self-defence is concerned.
 

A police officer shot and killed a suspect whilst investigating a report of a man terrorising his family.  At trial, the judge directed the jury that D was entitled to be acquitted for self-defence if his belief that his life was in danger, was a reasonable belief.
His conviction for murder was quashed by PC who stated that a mistake need not be reasonable in order for a defence to exist confirming Morgan.  D is to be judged on the facts as he believed them to be, confirming Gladstone Williams.
 

V was killed when he fell down some steps after being ejected forcibly from a pub by D, the landlord, after having refused requests to leave.  D was acquitted of manslaughter on the basis of defending his property.
In order to convict, CA stated that the jury must be ‘satisfied that the degree of force used was plainly more than was called for by the circumstances as he believed them to be’.
 

D, a soldier on duty in Northern Ireland, fired four shots at a car (stolen) which did not stop at a checkpoint.  The judge, sitting without a jury, accepted that the first 3 shots had been fired in self-defence or defence of a colleague but that the fourth, which killed, was not, as the car had passed the soldiers and was already 50 feet down the road.
On appeal, HL confirmed that killing by excessive force in self-defence is murder.
 

Defence of Duress

Two female prosecution witnesses gave false evidence because they were under threat of serious physical injury from a gang, one of whom was in the gallery of the court.  The court thought it immaterial that the threat could not follow at once since she had to make up her mind whether to commit the offence while the threat was operating.  Police protection could not be effective once the witnesses had left the court.
 

The defendant was a practising homosexual who was living with his lover and his wife.  The defendant and his boyfriend, killed his wife.  The boyfriend pleaded guilty but the defendant claimed that he took part in the events under duress because of his fear of his boyfriend.  He was convicted of murder.
The Court of Appeal stated that the test for duress is two-fold, as with provocation.  In provocation the words or acts of one person break the self control of another.  In duress, the words or acts of one person break the will of another.  The law requires the defendant to have the self control of a reasonable person and should therefore require the defendant to have the steadfastness of a reasonable person.  The defendant’s appeal was dismissed.
 

3 men and a boy were cast away at sea in an open boat 1600 miles from land.  They had no food for 8 days and no water for 6 days.  The men killed the boy and fed upon his body and blood for 4 days, when they were rescued.
The men were convicted of murder but were later pardoned after serving 18 months in prison.
 

This case concerned a Columbian importer of cocaine.  His defence was financial pressure; he had been threatened with disclosure of homosexual inclinations and threats of death or personal injury to himself and his family.  The defendant’s conviction was upheld but the Court of Appeal stated that threats of death or personal injury need not be the only reasons for committing the crime.
 

Along with 3 others, Howe was charged with 2 counts of murder and conspiracy to murder.  They raised the defence of duress but the HL dismissed their appeal stating that duress is not available for murder and confirming the tests for duress as stated in Graham [1982].  
 

The defendant joined a gang of robbers knowing that the gang used firearms.  He participated in a robbery during which the gang leader shot and killed the victim.  The defendant was charged with murder but raised the unsuccessful defence of duress.
 

Mustill LJ stated in the Court of Appeal:  Duress must be founded on the concession of human frailty where D has been faced with the choice between 2 evils.
It is no shield at all to a the defendant who had an opportunity to escape and did not do so or if the risk of duress was freely undertaken.
It is no excuse if a person joins a group of people who are dedicated to violence.
Common sense should prevail and we should be able to distinguish between violent political organisations and minor misdemeanours.
 

The defendant, aged 16, seriously injured his mother with a knife.  He pleaded not guilty to attempted murder, raising the defence of duress.  He stated that his father had threatened to shoot him unless he killed her.  The House of Lords dismissed his appeal stating that the defence of duress does not apply to attempted murder.
 

The defendant’s alcohol level was over the limit but he was pursued to his car and in fear of serious injury, he drove some distance down the road.  The defence of duress of circumstance was available to him as he had not, for example, driven all the way home.
 

This case concerned a group of Iraqi Shiite Muslims who hijacked a plane which eventually landed in the UK.  They claimed duress as a defence stating that their life would be in threat if they returned to Iraq.
 

The defendant was serving a life sentence and had been informed that his tariff had been substantially increased.  He broke out of prison and raised duress as a defence to prison-breaking.  It was conceded on appeal that he broke out because he had become suicidal, so there was a threat to his life, but since the threat did not come from an extraneous source it was no defence.